It is generally believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible, due to widespread acceptance of an impossibility proof that utilizes quantum entaglement cheating. In this paper, we delineate how the impossibiliy proof formulation misses various types of quantum bit commitment protocols based on two-way quantum communications. We point out some of the gaps in the impossibility proof reasoning, and present corresponding counterexamples. Three different types of bit commitment protocols are constructed with several new protocol techniques. A specific Type 1 protocol is described and proved unconditionally secure. The security proof of a specific Type 2 protocol is also sketched. The security of Type 3 protocols is as yet open. *
Appendix: security proof for QBC1 26 1 Introduction
There is a nearly universal acceptance of the general impossibility of secure quantum bit commitment (QBC), taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type entanglement cheating which supposedly rules out QBC and other quantum protocols that have been proposed for various cryptographic objectives [1] . In a bit commitment scheme, one party, Adam, provides another party, Babe, with a piece of evidence that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to her. Later, Adam would open the commitment by revealing the bit b to Babe and convincing her that it is indeed the committed bit with the evidence in her possession, which she can verify. The usual concrete example is for Adam to write down the bit on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe to be given to Babe, while keeping for himself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment.
The evidence should be binding, i.e., Adam should not be able to change it, and hence the bit, after it is given to Babe. It should also be concealing, i.e., Babe should not be able to tell from it what the bit b is. Otherwise, either Adam or Babe would be able to cheat successfully.
In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a trusted third party, or by invoking an unproved assumption concerning the complexity of certain computational problems. By utilizing quantum effects, specifically the intrinsic uncertainty of a quantum state, various QBC schemes not involving a third party have been proposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense that neither Adam nor Babe could cheat with any significant probability of success as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a supposedly general proof of the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC, and the insecurity of previously proposed protocols, was presented [2] - [6] . Henceforth it has been generally accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of principle [7] - [11] .
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases of equal and unequal density operators that Babe has for the two different bit values. The proof purports to show that if Babe's cussessful cheating probability P B c is close to the value 1/2, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Adam's successful cheating probability P A c is close to the perfect value 1. This result is stronger than the mere impossibility of unconditional security, namely that it is impossible to have both P B c ∼ 1/2 and P A c ∼ 0. The impossibility proof describes the EPR attack on a specific type of protocols, and then argues that all possible QBC protocols are of this type.
Typically, one would expect that a proof of impossibility of carrying out some thing X would show that any possible way of doing X would entail a feature that is logically contradictory to given principles, as, for example, in the cases of quantum no-cloning [12, 13] and von Neumann's no-hidden-variable theorem [14] . In the present case, one may expect a proof which shows, e.g., that any QBC protocol that is concealing is necessarily not binding.
It is important for this purpose that the framework of QBC protocol formulation is allinclusive. In the absence of a proof that all possible QBC protocols have been included in its formulation, any impossibility proof is at best incomplete. Indeed, in the QBC impossibility proof, only certain techniques of protocol design, such as the use of classical random numbers in a quantum protocol, are included in its formulation without showing that all possible techniques have been included. In this paper, we will describe several new techniques that are not accounted for in the impossibility proof formulation.
There are two related assertions in the impossibility proof that are crucial to both its claim of universality in general, and its specific claim of covering the use of random numbers in particular. These are the assertions that all measurements in the commitment phase of a quantum protocol can be postponed until the opening and the verification phases, and that classical random numbers can be equivalently described by pure quantum states, via quantum purification or the doctrine of "Church of the Larger Hilbert Space." As we will show in this paper, both assertions are fallacious in various ways. Furthermore, in the case of classical random numbers, the impossibility proof does not even give a correct quantitative formulation of the concealing condition, and thus proves nothing to begin with.
The essential argument of the general impossiblity proof is described in Section 2, and a proper framework for QBC protocols is discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe several new protocol techniques that lead to the development of three new types of protocols not covered by the impossibility proof. In Section 5 we describe Type 1 protocols, for which measurements during commitment cannot be postponed until opening and verification. A specific protocol QBC1 is presented, with unconditional security proved in the Appendix. In Section 6, the logic underlying Type 2 protocols is delineated. A specific protocol, QBC4, is presented with an outline of the security proof. In Section 7, the widely accepted equivalence between classical randomness and quantum purification is analyzed. We will show that they are not equivalent in bit commitment. We also introduce Type 3 protocols, the security status of which is yet undecided. The last Section (8) contains a brief summary of the main points.
The impossibility proof: Type 0 protocols
The impossibility proof, in its claimed generality, has never been systematically spelled out in one place, but the essential ideas that constitute this proof are generally agreed upon [3] - [11] . The formulation and the proof can be cast as follows. More generally, when classical random numbers known only to one party are used in the commitment, they are to be replaced by corresponding quantum entanglement purification.
The commitment of |φ bi with probability p bi in (1) is, in fact, an example of such purification.
An example involving Babe is an anonymous state protocol [15] - [17] where |φ bi in (1) is to be obtained by Adam applying unitary operations U bi on state |ψ k ∈ H B sent to him by Babe with probability λ k , k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Generally, for any random k used by Babe, it is argued that from the doctrine of the "Church of the Larger Hilbert Space" [10] , it is to be replaced by the purification |Ψ in 
It is claimed that any actual measurement during commitment can be postponed until the opening and the verification phases of the protocol without affecting the protocol in any essential way. In order to maintain quantum determinacy, the exact {|g l } in (3) are taken to be known to both parties. Let us use k to denote Babe's secret parameter, and i to denote Adam's secret parameter, such as the i with probabilities {p i } in (1). These crucial assumptions of openly known {p i }, {λ k }, {|f k }, and {|g l } are made in the impossibility proof through the use of known fixed quantum computers or quantum machines for data storage and processing by either party [3] , [6] , [9, Appendix] , even though the control of such machines belongs only to one of the parties.
Generally, Babe can try to identify the bit from ρ 
where |φ j are the eigenvectors of ρ 
The condition (5) says that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n 0 such that for all n > n 0 ,
< ǫ, to which we may refer as ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding. These cheating probabilities are to be computed purely on the basis of logical and physical laws, and thus would survive any change in technology, including an increase in computational power. In general, one can write down explicitlȳ
where · 1 is the trace norm, τ 1 ≡ tr(τ † τ ) 1/2 for a trace-class operator τ , but the correspondingP A c is more involved. Nevertheless, the impossibility proof shows that Adam can find a cheating U A that yields
within its formulation [2, 15] . Note that the impossibility proof makes a stronger statement (IP) than the mere impossibility of (US), i.e., (7) is stronger than (5) not being possible.
There are various gaps and implicit assumptions hidden in the impossibility proof, the presence of which renders the proof incomplete in several ways. As to be discussed in the following, some of these can be partially justified or closed, but many still remain. We will refer to protocols that fit this impossibility proof formulation as Type 0 protocols, and will describe three additional types, 1, 2, and 3, that are clearly not covered by this proof. Before proceeding, we first discuss what may constitute a QBC protocol.
Proper framework for protocol formulation
The following two principles, the Intent Principle and the Libertarian Principle, govern the viability and meaningfulness of any bit commitment protocol in a descriptive, not normative, sense. That is, they would be satisfied in what we would take intuitively to be a proper protocol, and are not imposed in a legislative fashion, as discussed in the following.
INTENT PRINCIPLE -Each party would act to achieve the intent of the protocol if no cheating by the other party is (probabilistically) possible.
Thus, each party would cooperate so that the protocol would not be aborted, which happens when one party is found cheating by the other through a possible cheat-detection mechanism during the commitment phase. Since each party can always just abort by noncooperation during any stage of any two-party protocol, the Intent Principle does not exclude any action not otherwise possible. Thus, if the cheating detection probability leads to an overall cheating success probability within the given ǫ, the protocol is a proper one and cannot be declared illegitimate because one party may keep cheating, though keep being detected.
We also have the LIBERTARIAN PRINCIPLE -Each party can freely perform any possible local operation at any stage of the protocol, constrained only by the Intent Principle for cooperation.
Thus, no party can be assumed to be honest in anything if the action leads to his/her own advantage and would not get caught. That is, each party can cheat whenever possible, unless it violates the Intent Principle for cooperation. There would be no need for any protocol if the parties can be assumed honest. Similarly, each party can do whatever is possible to thwart the other party's cheating.
Any sequence of two-way quantum communication exchanges that resuls in bit commitment under the Intent Principle is evidently a QBC protocol, whose security is to be analyzed under the Libertarian Principle. More importantly, any QBC formulation that fails to include all such sequences does not capture all possible QBC protocols. The present framework is more general than the "Yao model" [19, 6] in that cheating detection is allowed during commitment, and is more specific in the explicit formulation of the above two principles. It can be seen that the impossibility proof formulation is not complete in that it misses protocols with cheating detection during commitment because such detection would involve actual measurements that cannot be postponed until after commitment if |Φ b is assumed openly known. Otherwise, Adam may cheat successfully by utilizing detailed knolwedge of Babe's instrument, which makes it reversible, but which are actually irrelevant for the protocol.
Such a known |Φ b assumption is both unreasonable and unrealistic, in addition to violating the Libertarian Principle which allows Babe to use a different instrument for storage and processing. In particular, any orthonormal {|f k } and {|g l } would serve the purpose of the protocol. Even when the cheating detection can be deferred until after commitment without
Adam being able to cheat successfully because of that, the protocol may be fundamentally changed to only a cheat-sensitive one [19] . Also no proof has been given that a protocol is not fundamentally changed when an actual measurement is replaced by (3). This is becausē As in all QBC formulations so far, it is assumed in this paper that Adam opens perfectly on one bit value, say b = 0. More generally, one may allow QBC protocols that open on one bit with a success probability P 0 = 1 − ǫ ′ for a small ǫ ′ . It appears that protocols for which neither bit can be opened with near-unity probability are of little interest. In conjunction with ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding, one may then consider the possibility of (ǫ, ǫ ′ )-protocols, the detailed treatment of which will be given elsewhere.
New protocol techniques, or gaps in the impossiblity proof
In this section we describe three new techniques for constructing QBC protocols, which are not covered by the impossibility formulation. Our Type 1 protocol is based on the first technique, Type 2 on the next two and on random numbers, and Type 3 on the second one and on random numbers. Each of these protocol types will be discussed separately in the following sections.
In the first technique, Babe asks Adam to reveal a random part of his committed evidence, after which the protocol remains ǫ-concealing. As Adam is forced to measure on H A in order to respond, his cheating entanglement is destroyed.
The second technique introduces testing on states of an ensemble, in space or in time,
submitted by the other party, in order to check whether only admissible states of the protocol are being used. This was already utilized in QBC2 of Ref. [15] . The protocol is aborted if cheating is detected by a measurement. Such protocols are allowed under the Intent Principle, but not included in the impossibility proof formulation. The effect of this technique is to reduce, during quantum purification of a secret parameter, the use of any |Ψ ∈ H
to only those of the form (2) for a fixed set {|ψ k }. There is no need for this technique if one assumes, as in the impossibility proof, that only such |Ψ is to be used anyway.
Note that measurement postponement during commitment is needed to have a pure |Φ b at the end of commitment, the starting point of the impossibility proof. The argument for such postponement, as given by (3), does not apply to the case where U l acts on the space
Any protocol having such a step is not covered by the impossibility proof. Recall also that the known {|g k } assumption is unwarranted.
For the third technique, consider a protocol in which Babe forms (2) and sends Adam 
e.g., a fixed set S 0 of four possible BB84 states on a given great circle of a qubit. Adam Consider a protocol of the form (1) in which each |φ bi is a product of n qubit states.
Assume that if the states of any n 0 of n qubits are unknown to Babe, the protocol remains ǫ-concealing. Then, at the end stage of commitment, Babe can ask Adam to reveal the states in n − n 0 randomly chosen qubits in her possession, and check that they are correct. Babe cannot improve her cheating probability through quantum purification of this random choice of n−n 0 qubits, because this is an operation on the evidence Adam already commits. On the other hand, from (1) Adam has to make a measurement on the |e i to reply accurately, after which a particular |φ bj is pinned down, and he can only cheat by declaring a specific |φ 0j
to be another |φ 1i . The corresponding P A c may be arranged to be smaller than ǫ or, in any event, not having the limiting value one for large n and thus contradicting the impossibility proof. Note that the burden is on the impossibility proof claimer to show that such protocols are not possible, which has not been done.
Indeed, such protocols are not only possible, but can, in fact, be unconditionally secure.
A general subclass of such protocols can be described as follows. Let each qubit in |φ bj be in one of two possible states, |0 and |1 , and consider a Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1}.
There may be many Boolean functions f for which the above concealing requirement is fulfilled, as, for example, in the case of the parity function [15] . To prove unconditional security for such a protocol, one has to show thatP (ii) Babe randomly picks n 0 qubits among the n ones and asks Adam to reveal the remaining n − n 0 qubit states. She verifies that they are correct by measuring the corresponding projectors. One definite conclusion of this section is that, depending on the protocol, measurements may or may not be postponed to opening and verification without altering the essence of the protocol. While measurement postponement may maintain equivalence in some situations, there is already no argument offered in the impossibility proof as to why Babe's measurement during commitment would not help her defeat Adam's cheating, even though she cannot thereby improve her own cheating.
Who has which space: Type 2 protocols
The use of the second technique in Section 4, test for cheating via measurement, has the effect of changing and pinning down the ǫ-concealing condition of the protocol, as compared to one without the test. Generally, the condition
while weaker than
is not equivalent to
Specifically, (8) does not imply (10) because there can be a |ψ 1 for which ρ with H B 2 . This renders false the claim that the use of random numbers as in (10) can be equivalently described by their quantum purifications as in (8) . further discussion os this point is given in Section 7. Here we note that (9) is, in general, a sufficient but not necessary (at least not having been proved necessary) condition for the protocol to be concealing, again to be further discussed in Section 7. It is rather a severe restriction on the protocol that can be relaxed to (8) with test for cheating.
A Type 2 protocol would work as follows. A large n-sequence (n-fold tensor product) of qubit states, drawn independently with probability λ k from a fixed set S 0 = {|ψ k }, would be sent from Babe to Adam, each state named by its position in the sequence. Adam puts aside randomly chosen n 0 of them, and asks Babe to reveal the remaining n − n 0 ones for testing. For large enough n, Babe cannot use any |Ψ ∈ H B 1 ⊗ H B 2 other than that of the form (2) without getting caught with probability arbitrarily close to one, so that the concealing condition is (8), and not (9) . If Adam randomly picks one of the remainng n 0 , or m for full unconditional security, modulates it by a single U b for each b, and return it without the name to Babe, she would not be able to use her entanglement (8) effectively on any qubit. This technique is similar to the use of decoy states from Adam to Babe in [16, 17] , and results in an effective concealing condition (10) in place of (8), although (8) still applies overall. While the use of a single U b does not allow Adam to cheat successfully on a fixed qubit, the freedom from the n 0 -ensemble still allows him to entangle and launch an EPR attack. This attack is thwarted via the third technique of Section 4, which demands that Adam return the remaining n 0 − 1 qubits so Babe can verify that they have not been disturbed. Example 1, our protocol QBCp2, can be extended in this way to become an unconditionally secure protocol QBC2, which is a modified version of a protocol with the same name in Ref. [15] . Alternatively, the same logic applies to the following protocol, which is somewhat simpler.
PROTOCOL QBC4
(i) Babe sends Adam n qubits named by their temporal position, each drawn independently with equal probability from S 0 , a fixed set of four possible BB84 states.
(ii) Adam randomly picks n 0 of these qubits and sets them aside, and asks Babe to open the remaining n−n 0 ones. He verifies them to be correct in that they are distributed as prescribed in step (i). Otherwise the protocol is aborted.
(iii) Adam randomly picks m out of the n 0 remaining ones, modulates each by the same U 0 = I or U 1 = R(π), rotation by π on the great circle containing S 0 , and sends them back to Babe.
(iv) Adam opens by revealing b and returning the remaining n 0 −m qubits. Babe verifies by measuring the corresponding projectors.
By proper choice of m, n 0 , and n, this protocol can be made both ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding for any ǫ > 0, given that Adam opens perfectly on b = 0. The main steps of the proof may be outlined as follows. Babe can cheat by entangling over each individual qubit and also by using a distribution of qubits more biased than the one presented in step (i). To defeat her qubit entanglement cheating, let n 0 /n = ǫ 1 . The probability that she would pair H B 11 with the correct H B 21 , where
is thus ǫ 1 . If the pairing is incorrect, the trace distance in (7) is not affected because, for any three general states ρ, ρ ′ , σ,
If the pairing is correct, we take the upper bound value of two for the trace distance. By making both n 0 and n large and testing on the arbitrary n − n 0 qubits, one may guarantee, to within any ǫ 2 > 0 for the resulting P for any fixed m. This situation has been analyzed for QBC2 in Ref. [15] . From the union bound on probability, one may take ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 ≤ ǫ, and the protocol becomes ǫ-concealing.
The asymptotic situation at m, n 0 , n → ∞ is quite apparent even in the absence of any quantification with respect to the ǫ's. The protocol is binding on Adam, because m can be chosen large enough so that Adam's optimum one-qubit cheating probability p A becomes
7 Classical randomness and quantum purification: Type 3 protocols
A cornerstone of the general impossibility proof is the assertion that classical randomness can be equivalently described as quantum determinacy via purification, say by (2) First of all, it is clearly not true that all classical randomness can be reduced to that arising from quantum description of a system. After all, there were many scenarios for the occurrence of classical randomness before the rise of quantum physics, including especially classical statistical mechanics. Even if one grants a determinate quantum description for the underlying classical randomness involved, it is unreasonable to assume that any party would possess the detailed knowledge to write down the complete quantum description. However, in the context of QBC protocols, it is not only reasonable, but, in fact, mandatory to consider such purification (2) for which a party can form and use such purification for cheating.
Thus it is a consideration of concealing, not the "Church of the Larger Hilbert Space," that compels one to consider (2) . The usual vague argument, which relies on the equivalence and goes on to show that Babe's subsequent measurement cannot affect the situation, is not valid reasoning, because, while Babe cannot cheat better with her measurement, she may be able to thwart Adam's cheating as in QBC1. There is one sense in which a random k can be equivalently described by its purification (2) -if a measurement on H B 1 ⊗ H B 2 is always preceded by the measurement of {|f k } on H B 1 first. But then the concealing condition should be (10) and not (8) , and they are not equivalent, as seen in QBCp2.
The following argument, in the spirit of the impossibility proof, appears to show that the exact {|f k } in (2) need not be known by Adam for finding his cheating transformation.
Let the protocol be ǫ-concealing as a consequence of ρ cheating must be independent of the specific {|f k }, even though it is obtained for a known {|f k }. Note that this argument does not extend to the knowledge of {λ k }, or {|g l } which is not measured, or to Type 1 protocols for which the whole protocol would then be altered.
Nevertheless, even just for {|f k } this argument contains a major gap, which is, in fact, a general gap in the impossibility proof: it is not guaranteed that there is only one veryfing measurement for the protocol. In the particular case of randomness described above, it means that the split measurement of {|f k } of H B 1 , and then a measurement on H B 2 , is not the verifying measurement of Π that has been proved susceptible to cheating as prescribed by the impossibility proof. It is not true that whenever Π is verified on a cheating state, then so is the split measurement, and the cheating probabilityP proof given that there cannot be more than one verifying measurement, for which different cheating transformations are needed. However, it turns out that for protocols strictly of Type 0, I can prove that this is indeed the case in the sense (IP) of (7) for all perfectly verifying measurements, i.e., measurements that yield the "yes" result with probability one corresponding to the opening bit value.
However, condition (8) , which is taken to be the ǫ-concealing condition in the impossibility proof, is not a proper concealing condition due to the Libertarian Principle. Indeed, while it implies that Adam can cheat according to the impossibility proof, the situation is misrepresented in that it may be Babe who can actually cheat. An example is given in Appendix B of Ref. [17] . One cannot simply say that a protocol is now taken to be ǫ-concealing. One has to describe quantitatively a necessary ǫ-concealing condition for the protocol before any meaningful performance analysis can be made, which is something the impossibility proof fails to do in general.
Suppose that condition (9) is to be used, which is a sufficient condition that has not been shown to be necessary for concealing, as to be discussed later. For a Type 0 protocol that is perfectly concealing, it may be shown [17, 20, 21] that the cheating U A is independent of any {λ k } and {|f k } in ( is actually provable. A direct approach to the analysis of protocols is given in Ref. [20] .
However, what we have here is actually a game-theoretic situation involving freedom on both sides with opposing objectives with regard to the performance criteria P It makes little physical sense to consider the entanglement, ad infinitum, of {λ k } or {p i } or {|g l }. It is most appropriate to regard {λ k }, {p i }, and {|g l } as unknown with no meaningful distribution on them, a situation that happens in many problems of classical statistics whenever there is a lack of statistical regularity or meaningful ensemble, the same situation we have here.
It is argued in [22] that {λ k } has to be taken openly known in a meaningful protocol, because there is no guarantee that it can be kept secret. But surely a party can choose any {λ k } when forming (2) by his/her fancy of the moment, or by any beforehand chosen rule unknown to Adam. In any cryptographic protocol, one has to assume that anything one party does on her locality is not known to another party in a distant locality, relativity or not, or else nothing can be a secret. The issue is not why Adam does not know {λ k }. It is why he would know. Indeed, one may use the same reasoning and assume Babe knows U A so she can defeat Adam's cheating.
Generally, it is difficult to pin down a necessary condition for ǫ-concealing for an arbitrary protocol without utilizing specific information about the protocol details. In fact, the very meaning of concealing in an arbitrary protocol has to be decided upon. Thus, (9) due to averaging or to the game situation involving {λ k } just discussed. Thus, a general impossibility proof for Type 3 protocols would face the immediate obstacle of not being able to specify quantitatively either a necessary ǫ-concealing or ǫ-binding condition. One the other hand, security proof for a particular protocol is much easier because sufficient conditons and protocol mechanism can be specifically exploited.
We summarize the main points concerning random numbers.
1. Classical randomness is not generally reducible to quantum uncertainty.
2. The condition of ǫ-concealing with random numbers is not equivalent to its quantum purification version, i.e., (8) is not equivalent to (10).
3. The coefficients {λ k } in the quantum purification (2) are generally not known to the other party.
4. The concealing condition (8) used in the impossibility proof is, in general, neither necessary nor sufficient for concealing.
5. With random k and i, it is difficult to formulate a necessary ǫ-concealing or ǫ-binding condition in order to start an impossibility proof.
6. The general situation of an unspecified protocol, even the simple case (1), is gametheoretic.
Summary and conclusion
If there is a general impossibility proof for secure QBC, one should be able to apply it schematically to any proposed QBC protocol to show that it is insecure. This often cannot be done. The reason is that the impossibility proof formulation is quite restrictive, and many nontrivial details in a systematic proof have not been spelled out. Some such criticisms have already been discussed in Ref. [15] , but they are analyzed quantitatively in this paper.
We introduced several new techniques for protocol design, not covered by the impossibility proof formulation which only applies to what we call Type 0 protocols. We presented three new types of protocols:
• Type 1 -partial checking of evidence,
• Type 2 -shifting of evidence state spaces,
• Type 3 -utilization of anonymous states.
A specific Type 1 protocol, QBC1, is proved unconditionally secure in the Appendix.
We indicateed how a Type 2 protocol, QBC4, may be proved unconditionally secure. The situation is yet undecided for Type 3 protocols. There is no impossibility proof, but there is no protocol which is clearly secure either.
Nevertheless, the content of this paper hopefully makes clear the vast richness of this subject yet to be uncovered, especially for protocols that can be practically implemented in a realistic environment.
Appendix: security proof for QBC1
The procotol QBC1 of Section 4 functions in the simple way described by (1) with one additional stage at the end of commitment -Babe asks Adam to reveal part of the evidence to force him to make a measurement that destroys his entanglement. We now sketch the complete security proof.
The protocol can be made unconditionaly secure by proper choice of | φ|φ ′ | and n 0 , with n being the security parameter, as follows. Adam can guarantee concealing by using uniform probability 1/2 n−1 for each sequence of either parity. In that case,
be the even-and odd-parity n-bit sets. Then
and so
Thus, Babe's optimum quantum decision reduces to optimally discriminating between |φ and |φ ′ for each qubit individually, and then seeing whether there is an even or odd number of |φ ′ 's. the optimum error probability p e for each qubit is well-known [23, 15] ,
The optimum error probabilityP After committing |Φ 0 , Adam can still try to cheat with the {|e i } measurement by declaring one qubit to be in a state different from the actual one. the probability of success is P A c = | φ|φ ′ | 2 ≡ ǫ 1 , a design parameter of the protocol. He can also launch the usual EPR attack, with the result given by (IP) of (7) This protocol can be made ǫ-concealing by choosing
and, from (A.4), choosing n 0 to satisfy
To open b = 0 perfectly, Adam has to entangle only among subsets of the n qubits so that the overall parity is even. To improve his cheating probability beyond ǫ 1 , Adam has to entangle at least two qubits together. Since he has to measure on the space entangled to a set of qubits in order to reveal just one qubit in the set, his optimal action, as shown in the following, for getting at least one of his entangled set to survive the test is to entangle pairs of qubits among the n ones with the overall parity chosen to yield b = 0 or 1. Let n be even.
The probability P (n 0 , n) that the n 0 remaining ones contain no pair is P (n 0 , n) = 2 n 0 n/2 n 0 n n 0 .
(A.7)
For large n, (A.7) can be made arbitrarily close to one, i.e., lim n→∞ P (n 0 , n) = 1. Indeed, (A.7) is the best Adam can do for the following reason. Let n j ≥ 2, J j=1 n j ≤ n, be the number of elements in J distinct subsets of the n qubits that he entangles. The number of ways N for the remaining n 0 qubits not to contain even one such subset is clearly an increasing function of n j for fixed J and a decreasing function of J for fixed n. Thus N is minimized by having n j as small as possible and J as big as possible, which results in the numerator of (7) for J = n/2 and n j = 2. ThusP A c ≤ ǫ for large enough n, and the protocol is unconditionally secure.
Note that there is no need to compute ρ B b for the above pair entanglement and check concealing for them. There is also no need to assume that Babe would have to take Adam's a priori probabilities to be uniform. There is no game situation here, no probability that Adam may be able to cheat if he gives Babe a chance to cheat. This is because, from the Intent Principle of Section 3, Adam, not being able to cheat in any case, may as well use uniform prior probabilities to make the protocol ǫ-concealing.
For this protocol, QBC1, it is not hard to see that, if the probability P 0 = 1 − ǫ ′ of imperfect opening for b = 0 is allowed, the best state |Φ 0 needs to be ǫ ′ -close in norm to a perfectly pair-entangled one described above. Thus ǫ ′ can be added to ǫ 1 and ǫ when the parameters ǫ 1 , n 0 , and n are chosen for the modified protocol to be an (ǫ, ǫ ′ )-protocol.
